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A number of intertwined questions arise as we consider the relation between assertion 
and convention.1 Here are six: (1) Is invocation of a convention either necessary or 
sufficient for the performance of an act of asserting? (2) Do natural languages contain 
conventional devices whose job is to signal the making of an assertion? (The more 
general type of device is sometimes called an illocutionary force indicating device, 
and the device for assertion is sometimes called the assertion sign). If not, (3) could 
natural languages contain such devices, and if so, (4) should they? (5) Can an assertion 
be made without the use of words (which are on virtually all accounts conventional 
devices), or (6) without the declarative mood?
I have discussed questions 2–4 elsewhere (Green 1997, 2000b, 2002).2 Instead, in what 
follows I will focus on questions 1 and 6, while remaining neutral on 5. To that end, it will 
be helpful to view assertion as a practice produced and shaped by cultural evolution 
(Green 2017b). Cultural evolution helps to explain social phenomena as produced by 
learning (including but not limited to those cases involving teaching) rather than 
genetic inheritance, via horizontal (siblings, peers, etc.) rather than (or rather than 
exclusively) vertical transmission (from parents), and in a way that involves a ratchet-
like process so that ceteris paribus, the results are cumulative over time (Lewens 2012, 
2015). Behaviors in a culture that govern personal space or conversational turn-taking 
are not genetically inherited; rather, they are rather propagated by learning from sib-
lings, parents, and genetically unrelated community members. These characteristics 
taken together suggest that such behaviors and the norms that they both support and are 
guided by are culturally evolved. While there is substantial evidence that some aspects 
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of language, such as syntax, are the result in large part of genetic evolution,3 that view is 
less plausible as applied to speech acts. Instead, speech act types develop as institutions 
aiding speakers to achieve their social aims, such as permitting, guaranteeing, or forbidding 
certain courses of action, effecting changes in power or status hierarchies, or acquiring 
and transmitting information. As a first shot, it seems reasonable to suggest that assertion 
and its cognates are, or are bound up with, social practices designed by cultural evolution 
to support reliable information transmission.4
This evolutionary perspective on assertion justifies us in expecting to find some 
norms that are plausible candidates for the government of assertoric practice. However, 
a culturally evolved practice need not be governed by norms so precisely formulated as 
to be able to handle difficult unforeseen cases. We should thus be unsurprised to find an 
ambient level of indeterminacy in the formulation of assertoric norms.5 Let it, then, not 
go without argument that such phrases as “assertion’s norm” have a referent (or extension). 
Perhaps there is at least and at most one such norm (as the mentioned phrase suggests) 
governing assertion, but from an evolutionary perspective we need not assume that 
there must be. Instead, the proliferation of candidate norms (those couched in terms of 
knowledge, belief, truth, justification, and so on—many of which are discussed in this 
volume as well as in Brown and Cappelen [2014]) suggests that philosophers may be 
unduly optimistic about the sophistication with which our linguistic practices operate. 
Such optimism will be misplaced if it turns out that culturally evolved conversational 
practice is insufficiently refined to satisfy philosophers’ yearning for precision. While, in 
what follows, we will remain open to an ambient level of indeterminacy about assertoric 
norms, it will also behoove us to clarify some background concepts and make some pre-
liminary distinctions.
1. Assertion as objectual or propositional: As observed in Green (2013), “assertion” is 
polysemous rather than ambiguous, since the two senses of the term are non-trivially 
related. In the objectual sense, one can assert one’s rights or authority over, for instance, 
a bit of land, water, or other resource. One might instead assert one’s authority word-
lessly by making use of that resource while, where necessary, manifesting a willingness 
to defend that use against encroachment.6 One can also assert someone else’s author-
ity by acting as a proxy for that person. By contrast, propositional assertion (the more 
 familiar phenomenon to philosophers) is found in cases in which an agent expresses a 
propositional content in a certain way. Objectual and linguistic assertion do not share 
a word by accident, however, for both require a measure of moxie. One who asserts 
her authority over a resource is liable to having that authority challenged. So, too, one 
who asserts a proposition sticks out her neck, although some careful work is required 
to articulate the respect or respects in which she does so. In what follows we will use 
“assertion” to refer to propositional assertion only.
2. Speaker meaning: As it is typically understood in a large literature inspired by 
Grice (1957), an agent speaker-means a content just in case she performs an act in-
tending to produce a psychological effect in an addressee, with the further intention of 
producing that effect by means of the addressee’s recognition of that intention. This is 
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sometimes referred to as a reflexive communicative intention, but such a conceptual-
ization of speaker meaning may be challenged on two fronts. First of all, it is doubtful 
that in order to speaker-mean something, A must intend to produce a psychological 
effect in some addressee B by means of B’s recognition of A’s intention that this effect 
be brought about. As Vlach (1981) has observed, that condition does not seem appro-
priate for utterances in which we show that something is so, such as we find in some 
didactic situations: upon completion of a proof, the mathematics teacher who asserts 
to her class, “So you see, two triangles are in perspective axially if and only if they are 
in perspective centrally,” presumably wants her pupils to believe Desargues’s theorem 
on the strength of her proof. She would be disappointed if any of them believed that 
theorem even in part for the reason that they felt she intended them to do so. Unless 
we have some reason for denying that one can assert what one also has proven, this 
case will be a counterexample to the “reflexivity” part of the standard definition of 
speaker meaning.
It is even doubtful that to speaker-mean a content, one must also intend to produce a 
psychological effect on an addressee. Joan of Arc might say to her accusers, “God tells 
me what to do,” without intending that any of them will believe her since she knows how 
prejudiced they are against her (Vlach 1981). Or I could speak some unkind words to 
the portrait of my recently deceased, wealthy uncle who left me nothing in his will but 
this portrait.7
The reflexivity condition in the standard conception of speaker meaning is not entirely 
off the mark. However, that condition should be reformulated so as to require overtness 
while leaving aside intentions to produce effects on others. An action is overt when it is 
not only intentional but also when one intends to make the intentional nature of that 
act manifest.8 As illustration, think of the difference between jaywalking inadvertently, 
jaywalking intentionally, and jaywalking flagrantly. In the last of these cases, one not 
only jaywalks intentionally but also does so with the intention that this intention be read-
ily available to observers. (One might do this by adding a sashay to one’s stride so that the 
most reasonable explanation of one’s behavior is that one is trying to make the intentional 
nature of one’s behavior manifest). But a feature of one’s behavior may be readily accessi-
ble even if no one in fact accesses it: for any of a host of reasons, others may be distracted, 
intoxicated, or simply too obtuse to appreciate what one is doing and why.
Speaker meaning as understood here will thus be a matter of overtly manifesting 
either one’s psychological state or one’s commitments.
3. Speech acts and acts of speech: Acts of speech include all and only those acts 
 in volving the uttering of meaningful words. Such utterances need not be vocalizations: 
use of sign language involves utterances as well. But many acts of speech (such as when 
we test a microphone or rehearse lines for our part in an upcoming play) are not speech 
acts in the semitechnical sense of “speech act” used in the pragmatics literature. Instead, 
as the notion will be used here, a speech act is any act that can be performed just by 
saying and speaker-meaning that you are doing so, so long as you are in the appropriate 
social or epistemic position to perform such an act, and so long as any required uptake 
on the part of addressees is forthcoming.9 Promising is a speech act on this conception, 
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since as long as you are in a position to make the promise in question, and perhaps also 
on the further condition that your addressee accepts it, your saying and speaker mean-
ing, “I promise to meet you tomorrow,” will also be a promise.10 Excommunicating is a 
speech act on this conception, since so long as you have the requisite religious authority, 
merely uttering an appropriate form of words can count as excommunicating someone 
from a religious organization. By contrast, whispering is not a speech act, since no mat-
ter your social position, it is not the case that simply by saying and speaker-meaning 
that you are whispering, you thereby whisper. Likewise for convincing and impressing. 
Difficult borderline cases include insulting, since we may disagree about whether it is 
possible for one person to insult another without the latter feeling insulted. If so, insult-
ing is a speech act, while if not, then insulting is at most a consequence of other speech 
acts such as asserting, questioning, or suggesting. Further, on the present conception 
of a speech act, assertion comes out as one. (I shall use “speech act” and “illocutionary 
act” interchangeably. I shall also sometimes use “illocute” as a verb).
4. Illocutionary force and semantic content: Let us also distinguish between the force 
of a speech act and its content. The latter pertains to what is illocuted, whether it be 
a proposition or instead the semantic type associated with questions and commands. 
(We are not, that is, assuming that all content is propositional; instead, there may be 
distinctive types of content associated with imperative and interrogative sentences; see 
Green [2018b] for further elaboration). Force instead pertains to the way in which that 
content is illocuted. The content expressed by the remark, “You will be more punctual 
in the future,” may remain fixed, while in one utterance it is used as the vehicle of a pre-
diction and in another utterance as the vehicle of a command or even a threat. Cognate 
with the force/content distinction, we may also distinguish between an asserting and 
an asserted: the former is a spatiotemporal particular, while the latter is either a propo-
sition or whatever proxy we wish to put in place of propositions should we feel anxiety 
about positing such things.11
5. Assertion and the assertive family: It will also be useful in what follows to dis-
tinguish between assertion proper and other members of its family such as conjecture, 
presumptions, and educated guesses (Green,  2013). All members of the assertive 
family are united by the feature that their producer is putting forth a content as being 
true. However, they differ from one another in the nature of the commitment that the 
speaker undertakes in putting forth that content. For even one who makes an educated 
guess that P is still putting forth P as true, as is one who conjectures that P. Following 
Green (2017b), assertion and its kin may be distinguished from other types of illocu-
tion, as well as contrasted with one another, in terms of three strands of the notion 
of commitment that are not consistently disentangled by writers concerned with the 
topic: liability, frankness, and fidelity (LFF). Liability: one who asserts that P is liable to 
be right or wrong on the issue of P’s truth exactly as P turns out to be true or false; so 
too for conjecturers and even those who make sheer guesses. Frankness: this is another 
term for sincerity and marks the fact that an assertion is sincere just in case the speaker 
believes the content she has asserted; analogous remarks hold for other family mem-
bers.12 Fidelity: this term refers to a possibly inchoate set of behaviors that appear to be 
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mandated by one who asserts that P; among candidates are willingness to give reasons 
for the truth of P if challenged, and preparedness to act as if P is true (assuming that the 
agents’ desires are of the relevant sort), and authorizing others to use P as a premise in 
their reasoning or as a component of conversational common ground. This is not the 
place to decide just what fidelity to an assertion mandates, but some kind of “walking 
the walk” is required over and above “talking the talk.” Table 17.1 sums up the main points, 
while treating sheer guesses and suppositions as not being members of the assertive 
family on account of their not exhibiting all three components of commitment as that 
notion is understood here.13
6. Signaling and expressing without speaker meaning: As the term will be used here, a 
signal is any trait or behavior that conveys information and was designed to convey that 
information. The design in question may but need not be intentional behavior: just as 
the heart is designed to pump blood without this fact implying that any agent designed 
it for this purpose, so too a trait or a bit of behavior may be designed to convey informa-
tion about an organism by virtue of its being the result of genetic or cultural evolution 
(Green 2017a). Expressions differ from signals more generally by being signals of 
psychological states: one expresses one’s psychological state just in case one does some-
thing, or possesses a trait, that both shows and signals that state (Green 2007, 2011). 
Some expressions of psychological states may show them by making them percepti-
ble: a case has been made for this claim as it applies to certain emotional expressions 
(Green  2010,  2016b). Such a claim is less plausible for the expression of beliefs and 
other cognitive states. However, given the LFF constraints governing assertions, it may 
be argued that an assertion appropriately made shows the belief it expresses by provid-
ing compelling evidence for its presence. In this respect, assertion is analogous to those 
types of signals known in evolutionary biology as handicaps (Green 2009).
Table 17.1 Three Dimensions of Commitment for Four Members of the Assertive 
Family and for Two Nonmembers (Sheer Guesses and Suppositions)
Speech Act Liability Frankness Fidelity
Assertion Y Y: belief Y: provide strong justification if challenged
Conjecture Y Y: some reason to think  
content true; perhaps  
intention to investigate
Y: provide some justification if challenged; 
readiness to determine truth value of content
Presumption Y Y: intention to treat  
content as true
Y: treat content as true
Educated  
guess
Y Y: some reason to think  
content true
Y: provide some justification if challenged
Sheer guess Y N N
Supposition N Y: intention to investigate 
what follows from content
Y: reason with content to determine what 
follows
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Since neither signaling nor expressing is a species of speaker meaning, neither is 
sufficient for illocuting either. Nor is saying something in the thin sense of that notion. 
Thus, for all we have said so far, one’s utterance of an indicative sentence could be an act 
of expression rather than an illocution. For instance, an ironical utterance (“Nice job,” 
said in response to someone’s dropping a plate of food onto your lap) might be a way 
of pretending to compliment another person, while instead expressing a derogatory 
attitude toward him.14 So too, as Green (2016a) suggests, many so-called indirect speech 
acts may be more parsimoniously conceptualized in expressive rather than in illocu-
tionary terms.15 Further, although Grice and many who follow him take conversational 
implicata to be cases of speaker meaning, this assumption merits reconsideration: per-
haps some implicata are merely expressive. Someone asks Georgina where the cyclotron 
is, and she replies, “Somewhere in the south of town.” She may be speaker-meaning that 
she is ignorant of any further details about the cyclotron’s whereabouts; instead, how-
ever, she may merely be aware that were she to give a more informative answer, she 
would be in violation of the quality maxim,16 and so says as much as she can with the 
object of conveying a partial answer and indicating her ignorance. In that case she does 
not speaker-mean anything beyond what she says but might for all that be signaling her 
state of incomplete information.
Further, an illocutionary act could acquire an expressive dimension by virtue of the 
way in which it is carried out: intonation, prosody, and like features could imbue an 
utterance with an expressive quality such as sadness, anger, surprise, or contempt.
7. Illocutions versus illocutionary commitment: Assertion and other members of the 
assertive family are not deductively closed. That is, if I assert that P, and assert that P 
implies Q, I have not thereby asserted Q. However, I am committed to Q, and com-
mitted to Q in a certain way, which for lack of better terminology I will call assertoric 
commitment. Further, for certain purposes we want to keep track of the way in which 
a speech act can engender commitments that are sensitive to force and not just to 
content. If I assert P, but put forth if P then Q as a conjecture, then although I am not 
assertorically committed to Q, I am still committed to that content. In particular, I am 
committed to Q as a conjecture. For each member of the assertive family, we may dis-
cern a distinctive mode of commitment.
An explanation of why assertion and other members of the assertive family are not 
deductively closed is that one cannot inadvertently assert (conjecture, etc.) some-
thing. One might inadvertently commit oneself to a future course of action (say by 
accidentally clicking on a “pay now” button amid an electronic transaction), but doing 
so is not a promise to pay. So too, although one can inadvertently commit oneself to 
the truth of a proposition, one cannot do so in the distinctive way characteristic of 
assertions. A ready explanation of this fact is that assertion is a creature of intention: 
we’ll see this more clearly later in the course of exploring the relation of assertion to 
speaker meaning.
8. Conventions: I take a convention to be a regularity in behavior that has some 
degree of arbitrariness and that is supported or sustained by normativity. For instance, 
driving on the right side of the road in certain countries is a conventional form of 
Assertion and Convention   353
 behavior in those places due to the facts that it is relatively widespread, those following 
this pattern of behavior could have adopted a different practice (like driving on the 
right or switching annually, etc.), and that given that most people do drive on the right, 
it behooves me to follow suit. Driving conventions are plausibly solutions to coordina-
tion problems, but brief reflection reveals that many conventions neither are, nor are 
designed to be, such solutions.17
Given this understanding of convention, it comes out as uncontroversial, as it should, 
that words have the semantic properties that they do as a matter of convention. We could 
have used other words than those in use to say the things we do, but given that we do use 
the words that we do in our language(s), it behooves most of us to fall in with the behav-
ior of the majority. Since practical rationality is one form or normativity, it being in our 
interest to fall in line with others is enough to count as a form of normativity. Also, a pat-
tern of behavior can be conventional even if all parties to that pattern are ignorant of this 
fact; they might even think it is the only possible way of doing things. Further, nothing 
in the aforementioned account rules out the possibility of a convention whose character 
is in part due to an organism’s phenotype. Many nonhuman animal species use alarm 
calls to signal the presence of predators (Green 2017a). A species having an alarm call 
system is not conventional, since such a system does a job that no other feasibly accessi-
ble system could do for these species. However, given that a species has such a system, 
different dialects within subpopulations of that species may differ from one another 
conventionally. For instance, dialects among alarm call systems in Gunnison’s prairie dogs 
(Cynomis gunnisoni) may count as different conventional ways of signaling the presence of 
predators (Slobodchikoff, Ackers, and Van Ert 1998) so long those differences cannot be 
fully accounted for in functional terms.
2. Two Species of Conventionalism 
about Assertion
A thesis supporting the conventional character of illocutions generally, or of members 
of the assertive family, or of assertion specifically, should invoke on its behalf more 
than just the conventional nature of linguistic meaning. This is so for two reasons. 
First of all, no tokening of a semantically contentful expression is sufficient for illo-
cuting. For instance, as observed in Green (2017b), a somnambulist might utter the 
words, “It’s raining outside,” without making any assertion. Second, imagine some-
one reporting his new discovery of the conventional nature of sarcasm: sarcasm, 
research shows (Cheang and Pell 2008), is verbalized irony, with the further require-
ment that sarcasm tends to be used to express negative attitudes. Further, he continues, 
it is a sui generis form of activity that can only occur in the presence of conventions 
giving meaning to the words that are its vehicle. Surely this is banal. The bulk of what 
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is interesting about sarcasm is what it shares in common with irony. Likewise, if there 
is anything interestingly conventional about sarcasm, it should be shared in common 
with irony as well.
A more plausible conventionalist strategy will claim that speech acts require for their 
occurrence a layer of conventions that obtain over and above those giving words 
their meaning. Following Green (2014), call this force-conventionalism. We would not 
expect to unearth such a layer of conventions in explaining how it is possible conver-
sationally to implicate contents: conversational norms such as the cooperative principle, 
and the maxims of relation, quality, and the like, more likely flow from general con-
straints on effective conversation. Likewise, force-conventionalism is not established 
by the phenomenon of conventional implicature, which is driven by conventions gov-
erning lexical meaning.
Millikan (1998) defends a conception of convention that shares the two characteristics 
of arbitrariness and normativity given earlier while eschewing the requirement of 
regularity.18 She calls conventions as she construes them natural conventions, and 
on  the assumption that natural conventions are a type of convention, one would 
expect this strategy to make it easier to defend the view that speech acts are inher-
ently conventional. For Millikan, a natural convention is constituted by patterns that 
are reproduced by virtue of what she terms the weight of precedent (1998, 2). A pat-
tern is reproduced just in case it has a form that derives from a previous entity having, 
in certain respects, the same form, and in such a way that had the previous form been 
different in those respects, the current form would be different in those respects as 
well (1998, 3). Photocopying is one form of reproduction meeting these criteria; the 
retinotopic mapping from patterns of stimulation on the retina to patterns of stimu-
lation in the visual cortex is evidently another. Millikan would not treat retinotopic 
mapping as a type of convention, however, since it would not seem to be perpetuated 
by virtue of the weight of precedent. Insofar as Millikan cashes out the metaphor 
of weight, she does so in terms of what is in the best interests of the parties to the 
 convention in question.19 In this respect she invokes normativity without using 
that terminology.
Millikan next tells us that just as the conventions of chess dictate that when one’s king 
is in check, one does what one can to get him out of check; so too the conventions of lan-
guage dictate that when A tells B that P, B responds by believing that P. Millikan also 
describes the hearer’s response as a hidden, inner act that is not under B’s voluntary con-
trol (1998, 6). Millikan further describes this response as being learned in the way that 
we learn what she calls “natural sign patterns,” such as our learning that the sound of 
crashing waves is an indication of a nearby coastline.
On Millikan’s view, then, A’s assertion of P being followed by B’s belief that P is a 
process that is not intrinsically superior to others that might have been followed. Once 
we prise apart the way in which the semantic content of the sentence expressing 
the proposition P is conventional, the position may be doubted. What, after, all would 
be an equally efficacious alternative response? Disbelieving P? Remaining neutral 
on the question of P? Scratching one’s left earlobe? Any of these responses would tend to 
undermine using language as a means of transmission of information.20
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What is missing from Millikan’s view is an appreciation of the fact that assertion has a job 
to do in linguistic communities even if no agent or agents ever consciously designed the 
practice to do that job. Instead, assertion’s role in the reliable transmission of information 
brings with it design features supporting that role, and which are thus not arbitrary. This in 
turn is why, modulo some indeterminacy about the particular form that the standards take 
(knowledge, justification, truth, etc.), speakers who attain those standards can reasonably 
expect their addressees to accept what they say unless they harbor some unforeseen ground 
for skepticism. There are many ways of shaking hands other than the form that is dominant 
in modern, Western societies that would work equally well as social greetings. Modulo the 
aforementioned indeterminacy, there is only one way of making and responding to 
assertions if that practice is to subserve reliable transmission of information.
An ordinary-language tradition advocated by philosophers such as Austin, Searle, 
and Dummett insists on a different basis that assertion is a conventional act. Austin 
(1962), for instance, holds that all of what he calls illocutionary acts depend for their 
occurrence on the invocation of conventions. In characterizing felicity conditions for 
speech acts, for instance, he writes,
There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional 
effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in 
certain circumstances. (1962, 14)
Austin’s student J. Searle follows him in this, writing,
. . . utterance acts stand to propositional and illocutionary acts in the way in which, 
e.g., making an X on a ballot paper stands to voting. (1969, 24)
Searle elaborates on this remark, writing,
. . . the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventional realiza-
tion of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, and . . . speech acts are acts 
characteristically performed by uttering sentences in accordance with these sets of 
constitutive rules. (1969, 37)
Searle espouses a weaker form of force conventionalism than does Austin in leaving 
open the possibility that some speech acts can be performed without constitutive rules. 
Nevertheless, Searle does contend that speech acts are characteristically performed by 
invoking constitutive rules. Such conventions appear to be extra-semantic in that they 
go beyond those imbuing words with meaning. On this force-conventionalist view, one 
who utters
(1) Bucharest is the capital of Romania
only makes an assertion if she invokes or is otherwise subject to a convention to the 
effect that appropriate utterances of certain forms of words are either necessary or suffi-
cient for assertion.
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Strawson (1964) challenges force-conventionalism on the ground that while some 
speech acts, such as declaring war or marrying, apparently depend on extra-semantic 
conventions, it is doubtful that all do. Accepting is a speech act on the criterion given 
earlier, but it would seem that I can accept a proffered morsel of food simply by mani-
festing my willingness to do so, and I could do this outside of a shared culture in which 
any conventions would have a chance to develop.
Strawson proposes instead that some speech acts rely for their occurrence not on 
(extra-semantic) conventions, but rather on the speaker’s manifesting appropriate 
intentions. On his line of thought, one who utters (1) in such a way as to manifest an 
intention that it be taken as a statement of known fact rather than, say, a supposition for 
argument’s sake or a conjecture thereby asserts that Bucharest is the capital of Romania. 
This view may acknowledge that certain other speech acts such as excommunicating 
and promoting depend on extra-semantic conventions. For the remainder, Strawson 
advocates explaining them as types of speaker meaning, itself elucidated in intention-
alist terms. The challenge is to specify the type needed to, for instance, differentiate 
asserting from conjecturing and from guessing. To that end we will next articulate 
two approaches to assertion, one in the tradition of construing it as the expression of 
belief, and the other giving pride of place to a view of assertion as an undertaking 
of commitment.
3. Two Nonconventionalist  
Approaches to Assertion
3.1. Assertion as Belief Expression
Given the close connection between assertion and the intentional expression of belief, 
some authors have attempted to define assertion in terms of expression and intention. 
Bernard Williams, for instance, says, “A asserts that p where A utters a sentence S which 
means that p, in doing which either he expresses his belief that p, or he intends the person 
addressed to take it that he believes that p” (2002, 74). As Green (2013) argues, however, 
this characterization is inadequate since its conditions can be satisfied in a situation that 
is not one of assertion: rehearsing lines for a performance of Guys and Dolls in which I’m 
about to play the role of Big Jule, I utter the words, “If it gets around in Chicago that 
I went to a prayer meeting, no decent person will talk to me!” I know that you are eaves-
dropping from within my closet, and I am aware further that you don’t realize that I’m 
merely rehearsing lines for a play. Out of spite, I also intend you to think, based on my 
utterance, that I believe that I went to a prayer meeting. However, I have not asserted 
that I went to a prayer meeting, but instead have only made as if to assert this. In this 
situation, then, I satisfy Williams’s conditions for making an assertion but have not in 
fact made one. This, in turn, suggests that his conditions are too broad for delineating 
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assertion proper. (A moment’s reflection will reveal that his conditions are also too 
broad to characterize other members of the assertive family).
The utterance in the foregoing example is intentional but not overt. Accordingly, a 
more promising account of assertion in the same spirit is that of Bach and Harnish, who 
define a speaker’s asserting that p as occurring just in case that speaker expresses a belief 
that p while also expressing an intention that her addressee come to believe that p by 
means of recognition of his intention (1979, 42). Because of its reliance on audience-
directed intentions, this definition would seem to run afoul of cases in which a speaker 
addresses an assertion to an implacable accuser (as in the earlier Joan of Arc case), an 
inanimate object (as in the earlier case of one’s uncle’s portrait), a nonlinguistic animal, 
or a prelinguistic human.
A view of assertion avoiding these difficulties construes it as an overt expression of 
belief. Such an act may be sincere, in which case the speaker is expressing her belief; 
on the other hand, the speaker may be dissimulating, in which case her act is merely 
expressive of belief. Unfortunately for addressees, it is not always clear whether a speaker 
is expressing her own view or instead just appearing to do so. However, in light of what 
I elsewhere call the genitive-or-generic account of expression,21 she is expressing belief 
either way. Also, the overtness that our account builds in does not require audience-
directed intentions, while also sidestepping the difficulties facing Williams’s account. 
Further, since one evidently can also express cognate states of mind such as conjectures 
and guesses, we may see a path to the characterization in expressive terms of other 
members of the assertive family.22
MacFarlane (2009) challenges the view of assertion as belief expression on the ground 
that it cannot distinguish between assertion and conversational implicature. The reason 
is that one who conversationally implicates P would also seem to be expressing her belief 
that P; yet conversational implicature and assertion are normally taken to be exclusive 
categories. We have already seen, however, that some types of conversational implica-
ture should be seen as signals rather than as instances of speaker meaning; that was the 
gist of the cyclotron case earlier. In that case the speaker expresses but does not overtly 
express her belief that she can be no more specific about the cyclotron’s whereabouts. 
The view of assertion as overt belief expression will therefore not be harried by such 
cases. On the other hand, some implicata not only violate but also flout conversational 
norms. This is what occurs in many cases of “damning with faint praise.” Here it is plau-
sible that the speaker is not just expressing but also overtly expressing her belief that the 
entity being faintly praised is mediocre. But it is also plausible that the speaker is telling her 
audience that the entity being faintly praised is mediocre. A member of the admissions, 
hiring, or promotion committee might read such a letter and remark, “The recommender 
told us what we need to know.” But since telling is a species of assertion, the writer has 
also made an assertion.
Suppose that future space exploration reveals a planet inhabited by individuals who 
speak the language of first-order predicate logic. The discovery would be enthralling but 
also bittersweet because such speakers would lack the linguistic tools for making dis-
tinctions that help conversation go smoothly. Lacking it-clefts (and in the absence of 
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some other device to do the job such as intonation), for instance, they would be unable 
to indicate that a bit of information has already been established in conversational 
common ground, as we find with
(2) It was Norbert who ate cheese.
A speaker of (2) normally presupposes, rather than asserts, that someone ate cheese and 
proffers the proposition that Norbert is the culprit in the cheese incident for addition to 
our stock of information. This is consistent with our account of assertion as overt belief 
expression, because it may be doubted that the speaker of (2) overtly indicated her 
belief that someone ate cheese. She may have indicated that belief in so speaking, perhaps 
even intentionally, but neither condition suffices for overtness.
Presupposition is usually understood as contrasting with assertion so that a content 
cannot be both presupposed and asserted in one and the same utterance. However, 
 so-called informative presuppositions challenge this simple picture. Consider this 
exchange about a new employee in our office:
A. George sure is handsome!
B. His fiancé thinks so, too.23
B’s response is likely intended to notify A that George is affianced, and B is naturally 
construed as doing so overtly. On the conception of assertion as overt belief expression, 
B is thus asserting that George is spoken for. True, the genitive construction by which B 
achieves this result is normally thought of as a locus of presupposition rather than of 
assertion. This, however, is no serious challenge to the belief-expression view of asser-
tion suggested here. Instead our response to the present case should be to point out that 
some linguistic constructions normally designed for one kind of job can sometimes be 
co-opted for another.
The foregoing belief-expressivist account of assertion is neutral on the question 
whether all assertions require the use of language. (Whether they do or not presumably 
depends on what is required to make one’s intentions overt). Finally, this belief-expressivist 
account is not only consistent with but also can account for the relevant LFF properties. 
For one who believes that P is liable to be right or wrong in the issue of P precisely when 
P is true or false; her expression of belief is frank only if she believes the proposition she 
expresses; and her believing that P would, if she is rational, incline her to respond to 
appropriate challenges of the form, “Why do you think that?,” with strong reasons in 
support of what she believes.
3.2. Assertion as Commitment Undertaking
We need not here decide between the foregoing belief-expression account of assertion and 
a different account on which it consists in a certain kind of undertaking of commitment. 
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If instead we can establish that on either account, assertion can occur without 
 conventions—or at least without extra-semantic conventions—that will only strengthen 
our case. An early version of the assertion-as-commitment view is Searle (1969), who 
construes an assertion of P as an “undertaking to the effect that P.” Such an account is a 
necessary condition at best, since other members of the assertive family satisfy it as well. 
Further, such an account leaves it unclear whether someone could satisfy it by privately 
judging that P. For in such a case we also have an undertaking.
A more promising version of the approach will see assertion as an overt undertaking 
of commitment, in line with the notion earlier of speaker meaning in terms of overtness. 
Here, too, however, further refinement is needed, since as we have seen, commitment, 
even to the contents of indicative sentences, comes in different forms. Accordingly we 
may here construe assertion as the overt undertaking of assertoric commitment. So long 
as we can offer an independent account of the difference between assertoric and other 
forms of commitment, this account will not be circular. Such an account is found on the 
appropriate row of Table 17.1.
As with the view of assertion as overt belief expression, an elucidation of assertion in 
terms of overt commitment may remain neutral on whether verbalization is required 
for assertion. While intuitions about assertion may be equivocal, it seems clear that one 
cannot tell someone something, or say that something is so, unless one uses language; 
and these two are near-enough synonyms to “assert” to raise doubt about it as well. A full 
sentence is not, however, required for asserting, telling, or saying. To see why, consider 
the following case. Suppose that I have witnessed a crime, and some authorities are now 
seeking to ascertain the identity of the perpetrator. They have reason to think I know the 
perpetrator’s identity but do not want her or him to know that I know this. For this rea-
son the authorities arrange to have their top suspects congregate together on the pretext 
of an irrelevant bureaucratic issue (such as that they all need to be in a certain office to 
have a form signed) and arrange to have me be present at the time of their meeting. One 
of the authorities is present as well. When these suspects congregate as arranged, I, spot-
ting the perpetrator, write the name “Mr. Pink” on a slip of paper and surreptitiously 
hand it to the authority.
Here it would seem I have told the authorities who the perpetrator is and, therefore, 
that I have asserted that Mr. Pink is the perpetrator. (It is less clear what I have said. It 
may be that in this case I have only said, “Mr. Pink.”) While some pragmatic reasoning 
will evidently be required on the part of the authorities to discern the content that I have 
asserted on the basis of what I have uttered, we should not infer from this that I have 
merely conversationally implicated that Mr. Pink is the perpetrator. Pragmatic pro-
cesses issuing in the determination of what is illocuted are distinct from the process of 
determining a conversational implicature.24 Furthermore, we have good reason to deny 
that such an utterance is merely elliptical for “Mr. Pink is the perpetrator.”25 Nonetheless, 
both the belief-expression and commitment view of assertion may see this case as falling 
within its remit: when I write “Mr. Pink” on the paper, I not only express but also overtly 
express my belief that that man is the perpetrator. Similarly, in so doing, I have undertaken 
the three LFF components of commitment characteristic of assertion as delineated 
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earlier: I am liable to be correct or incorrect depending on whether Mr. Pink is indeed 
the perpetrator; I would be rightly charged with lying if I did not believe that Mr. Pink is 
the perpetrator; and I am responsible for putting up some sort of defense if challenged 
on the contention that Pink is the perpetrator.
It will be helpful to keep this background in mind as we consider a recent argument 
for force-conventionalism.
4. A Recent Argument for 
Force-Conventionalism
Michael Dummett writes,
. . . assertion consists in the (deliberate) utterance of a sentence which, by its form 
and context, is recognized as being used according to a certain general convention.
(1973, 311)
Dummett may here be read as making a weaker or a stronger claim. According to Strong 
Dummett, it is necessary and sufficient for asserting that P, that one deliberately utter a 
sentence that expresses the content P. According to Weak Dummett, it is necessary and 
sufficient for asserting that P, that one deliberately utter a sentence in a situation in 
which others recognize that one is invoking a convention counting that utterance as an 
assertion of P. We could worry the threads of either of these accounts. (For instance, 
does the deliberate utterance that either requires mandate not just that the speaker says 
what she does deliberately, but also that she knew what she was getting herself into?) We 
need not to fuss over such details here, however. Instead, let us note straightaway two 
problems with Strong Dummett. First, as Davidson (1979) argues, one could deliber-
ately utter an indicative sentence without meaning it, for instance in the course of 
being sarcastic: I say, “That was brilliant,” in response to your spilling lighter fluid over 
the meager bit of food we have left in this desolate wilderness. I have not asserted that 
your performance was brilliant and yet have met the condition specified in Strong 
Dummett.26 Second, as Stainton (2016) observes, one can make assertions without 
using whole sentences, such as we observed in the Mr. Pink case earlier.
Stainton (2016) advocates a view that preserves Weak Dummett’s spirit if not its letter. 
His starting point is a distinction between two classes of verbs and their associated 
actions:
A-class: Asserting, affirming, claiming, telling, stating, saying, declaring, avowing, 
professing
B-class: Giving to understand, implying, conveying, intimating, insinuating, hinting
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The reader might find this distinction puzzling, since both classes are heterogeneous. 
For unless Stainton is using “say” in the idiosyncratic way that Grice did,27 on its more 
typical use, one can say that P without committing oneself to P or to any other related 
proposition. By contrast, all the other A-list verbs involve commitment to contents. 
Instead, if they are united by any property at all, it is in mandating verbalization.28
Stainton claims that the project of his essay is to discern the difference between the 
concepts referred to in the A-list and those in the B-list (396). However, he also coins a 
word to cover the A-list terms, full-on stating, which in some of his usage seems to be a 
type of stating that is paradigmatic. (He also uses “straight-up” [395] and “full-blown” 
[401] to describe the phenomenon of interest to him). However, others of the author’s 
uses of “full-on” allow it to characterize subsentential assertions, which presumably 
are genuine speech acts but are not paradigmatic. Here “full-on,” “straight-up,” and 
“full-blown” seem just to mean “real” or “genuine.” These two distinct uses of “full-on” 
raise the danger of equivocation. The reason is that a full understanding of, for 
instance, claiming, would include discussion of nonparadigmatic cases, such as those 
that are not sincere or are cryptic in some respect. If, however, one views the A-list 
items through the lens of a “full-on” illocution sensu a paradigmatic one, those non-
paradigmatic usages will be defined away or at least swept into the background. To 
safeguard against mischief, we shall keep an eye out for genuine but nonparadigmatic 
instances of A-list items.
Stainton also distinguishes between language-transcendent and linguistically con-
stituted actions. The former include the act of accepting something, such as a morsel 
of food. One can use language to accept something (for instance, by saying, “Thanks; 
I accept!”) but need not do so. The linguistically constituted class includes writing a 
sonnet, as well as being sarcastic, as previously discussed. Just as the introduction of 
words creates the possibility of sarcasm, so, too, the introduction of the declarative 
mood, Stainton avers, creates the possibility of full-on stating via a sentence in that 
mood. It is accordingly not possible to full-on state (assert, claim, tell, etc.) until the 
declarative mood has been introduced into the language; assertion is for this reason 
linguistically constituted. However, Stainton contends that once full-on stating is 
possible, speakers may also full-on state that P without using a complete sentence, 
for instance by using a subsentence lacking grammatical mood. He fleshes this out 
with a five-stage just-so story:
i) Prior to the existence of full-on stating, there was quasi-stating, a language-
transcendent action of, say, sharing information, expressing beliefs, etc. ii) It 
proved convenient and efficient to have a conventional linguistic tool specifically 
for quasi-stating, so the declarative mood came to be. iii) When that function-
bearing device arose, it birthed a new sui generis conventionally-constituted kind 
of action, full-on stating. iv) That novel speech act brought in its wake a novel way 
in which an agent may fail, namely he may lie. Put in terms of another metaphor, 
a new kind of “target” arose, such that one who hits it can go morally wrong in a 
new way. v) Finally, clever and creative people found ways to achieve the sui generis 
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action, full-on stating, without using the job-laden device—thereby nonetheless 
incurring the new sort of “normative risk,” i.e. opening themselves up to the novel 
means of failing, the one unique to the A-class actions, lying. (2016, 407)
We have agreed that all activities named by members of the A-list require verbalization; 
yet Stainton is making a stronger claim than that members of this list require verbalization. 
(That’s all to the good, for if he were not, then his claim would be no more interesting 
than the claim that sarcasm is conventional because it requires verbalization). Instead, 
his contention here is that the syntactical category of the declarative mood is intimately 
related to the pragmatic property of being an assertion. That intimate relation is expressed 
in the ideas that assertions (stating, etc.) are acts that cannot be performed unless they 
occur in a language containing the declarative mood.
It has for decades been widely agreed among philosophers that there can be no 
intimate connection between any particular form of words (such as “x is good”) and a 
pragmatic property (such as approving). Any attempt to link the two conventionally will 
be unstable because, inevitably, jokers, storytellers, and microphone testers will use the 
form of words without instantiating the pragmatic property; in many cases, they could 
just as well instantiate the pragmatic property without using the form of words. The 
denial of a link between lexical items and pragmatic properties has been enshrined in 
the thesis of “On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning” (Green 1997). But pragmatic 
phenomena are not just autonomous of linguistic meaning; they are autonomous of 
grammatical properties as well. The active voice is by comparison with the passive voice 
better suited to representing agency. Yet no one could reasonably claim that representa-
tion of agency is only possible in a language containing active constructions. Or imagine 
a contention on behalf of the linguistically constituted nature of some forms of talk 
about the past. In English, the past perfect tense has the distinctive role of enabling 
speakers to refer to past events that are already completed. Should we conclude that the 
introduction of the past perfect birthed a wholly novel, sui generis, language-constituted 
kind of action? Such a conclusion would be warranted only if there were no other way in 
which to present past events as already completed. But surely a speaker could refer to a 
past event with facial expression, gesture, or intonation in such a way as to indicate that 
the event is completed.
Similarly, Estonian uses the narrative mood, which enables speakers to characterize 
events as ones about which they have only secondhand evidence, rather than being ones 
they have witnessed themselves (Metslang and Sepper 2010). This is a useful device. 
But that acknowledgment is a far cry from the momentous claim that the introduction 
of the narrative mood at some point in the history of Estonian created a wholly novel, sui 
generis, language-constituted act. Instead, speakers who do not or cannot avail them-
selves of the narrative mood may use facial expression, intonation, or gesture to indicate 
that they lack direct knowledge of the events they report; failing that, they may avail them-
selves of indirect discourse. No compelling reason yet presents itself for differentiating 
Stainton’s declarative mood contention, on the one hand, from our evidently fanciful 
claims about the active voice, past perfect, and narrative moods, on the other.
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5. An Austere Language in Which  
to Assert
In the previous section I argued that the intimate connection Stainton imputes between 
the declarative mood and full-on stating is inadequately supported. In this section I will 
first argue that it is possible to full-on state in a language entirely lacking in declarative 
mood. Stainton avers that it is necessary and sufficient for full-on stating that one perform 
an act in which it is possible to lie (2016, 407). I will assume this biconditional in what 
follows. If my argument is sound, it will show that Stainton’s claimed intimate connection 
is not just inadequately supported but also incorrect.
Stainton need not take issue with the Mr. Pink case of the previous section, since his 
story also includes stage (v). However, we may challenge his account by offering a rival, 
more parsimonious just-so story that dispenses with stage (ii): that is, revise the earlier 
quoted just-so story so that it eschews the supposition of the introduction of the declara-
tive mood. In this new story, speakers still use words to say things, but only ever in the 
form of subsentences such as noun phrases (NPs), verb phrases, prepositional phrases, 
and adjectival phrases, and the like, allowing their interlocutors to discern the rest of 
what they mean with the aid of inference to the best explanation.
Speakers in this clauseless community—call them speakers of Phrasish, which allows 
for the construction of no declarative sentences—may not able to full-on, straight-up, or 
full-blown state in the “paradigmatic” sense of that term. Indeed, Phrasish is depauper-
ate in other respects: like the aliens’ language of first-order predicate logic of section 2, it 
does not readily allow for the delineation within an utterance of a main as opposed to a 
subsidiary point. So too, explicit inferential reasoning will be difficult at best. None of 
these deficiencies, however, prevents Phrasish from being a language in which speakers 
can make assertions, claims, or statements. Further, this is so whether we assume an elu-
cidation of assertion in terms of overt belief expression or an elucidation of that notion 
in terms of overt commitment.
Further support for the view that speakers of Phrasish can make assertions is that 
they can lie. We can readily imagine a revision of the Mr. Pink case in which this occurs. 
Or take a PP case: imagine a horse in our care has got away, and we are wondering where 
it might be. I, who watched it go there, say, “Behind the barn.” Unless you have greatly 
misconstrued the intentions with which I spoke, you may readily deduce that I am 
claiming, of this horse, that it has a certain property. I am thus a liar if I saw that animal 
canter into the woods. Such de re attributions, however, are too primitive to require 
characterization in terms of the declarative mood.
If our analysis is correct, then, assertion turns out to be a language-constituted act 
only to the extent that it requires verbalization; however, assertion does not require 
 verbalization in the form of a declarative sentence but instead can be achieved with a 
phrasal utterance. Furthermore, such phrasal assertions can be carried out in a linguis-
tic community in which no declarative mood is in use.
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Carstairs-McCarthy (2005) and Hinzen (2007) have also argued that the declarative 
mood is inessential for asserting. The latter contends that there could be a language in which 
speakers only use NPs to communicate. Speakers could, for instance use such NPs as “the 
present Emperor of Japan” to claim that Japan has a unique, current emperor. Hinzen con-
tends further that instead of assessment in terms of truth, uses of such NPs could be assessed 
in terms of “applicability.” The aforementioned NP is applicable, on this usage, while an NP 
such as “the present emperor of China” is not since that country no longer has an emperor.
Jary (this volume) responds to Hinzen by contending that if his imagined language-
community did use NPs to make assertions, then those NPs would come to have the 
declarative mood: “. . . even if Carstairs-McCarthy and Hinzen are right and the category 
of sentence is not required for assertion, accepting this does not entail accepting that the 
declarative mood is not required for assertion. Rather, consideration of their arguments 
leads to the conclusion that assertion does require a form-function pairing. In the sce-
nario that these authors ask us to consider, one in which a language has no verbs and, 
hence, no clauses, NPs would be assertoric forms and so declarative in mood.”
In arguing for his conclusion, Jary would apparently have to assume that if a linguistic 
type is regularly used in a certain way, then it must come to have grammatical properties 
reflective of that usage. It seems more parsimonious to suggest that such grammatical-
ization may occur, but need not do so. Further, we may note that even if Jary is correct to 
hold that in Hinzen’s scenario, NPs must become grammaticalized to reflect their use 
to make assertions, that will provide no succor to the conventionalist about assertion. 
For the imputed inevitability of the declarative mood will violate one of the requirements 
for convention, namely arbitrariness. On such an approach to the declarative mood, its 
use in assertions is no more conventional than is the having of a sharp edge useful for 
enabling knives to cut things.
Without considering Phrasish by name, Jary also in effect considers the possibility 
that a view of assertion as belief expression could support the view that speakers of 
Phrasis can make assertions. He rejects this view on the ground that MacFarlane (2009) 
has raised objections to the belief-expression approach to assertion. However, we have 
seen that those objections do not undermine the account of assertion as overt belief 
expression. As such, we may still claim to have made a reasonable case that assertion is 
facilitated by, but not crucially dependent upon, the presence of the declarative mood in 
the language community in which that speech act takes place.
Returning now to the questions ((1), (5), and (6)) with which we began, we may now 
see that invocation of a convention is not necessary for the making of an assertion; see 
note 1 for a qualified claim that it is sufficient. We have not taken a stand on (5), and we 
have answered (6) in the negative.
Notes
 1. My thanks to Sandy Goldberg, Mark Jary, and Lionel Shapiro for their insightful comments 
on earlier drafts of this essay.
 2. In the papers cited, I argue that natural language neither does nor could contain devices 
the tokening of which is sufficient for the making of an assertion or any other speech act. 
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This suggests (though it does not entail) that it is not the case that natural languages should 
contain such devices. However, I also argue that some natural languages contain devices, 
which I call weak illocutionary force indicators, the tokening of which in a speech act is 
sufficient for the performance of at least one other speech act.
 3. See Fitch (2010) for an overview of the evidence.
 4. Garcia-Carpintero (2004) offers a complimentary perspective.
 5. Such indeterminacy would be over and above the indeterminacy that we confront not just 
in the ascription of attitudinal content but also in the ascription of attitudinal modality 
itself. For arguments for the latter claim, see Green (1999).
 6. In this respect, objectual assertion is a signal in the sense of that term delineated in 
point 6.
 7. We might try to defend the standard account of speaker meaning by suggesting that in 
some of these cases the speaker is only making as if to speaker-mean something. This 
might be plausible if she were not intending to be held accountable for what she says. 
However, someone lost in the woods might call for help without intending to be heard, 
due to her judgment of the extreme unlikeliness of anyone else being within earshot. She 
might nevertheless intend to be held accountable for what she says. More broadly, while 
we need not see the counterexamples in the text to the psychological condition as being 
decisive, together they can motivate consideration of other possible formulations of the 
concept of speaker meaning that would avoid such controversy.
 8. Not just any old others, however: we sometimes communicate cryptically in such a way 
that our remarks are designed to be discernible only to a select few.
 9. This characterization is developed more fully in Green (2014). The term “say” here is used 
in the “thin” sense of being a locutionary act. Also, the formulation in the text does not 
imply that every speech act type carries substantial requirements concerning a speaker’s 
social or epistemic position.
 10. Whether promising requires uptake is a question that we need not settle here.
 11. Green (2018b) develops and refines the force/content distinction and defends the result-
ing view against recent challenges.
 12. Goldberg (2015) denies that all proper assertions must be sincere, contending instead that 
in some cases, such as when a philosopher is defending a position, an assertion may be 
proper so long as the speaker is “relevantly authoritative.” I would tend to categorize 
such utterances as conjectures rather than as assertions, but if I am mistaken about this, 
then no harm is incurred in formulating the frankness condition for the assertion row of 
Table 17.1 disjunctively.
 13. Shapiro (this volume) provides a rich and historically informed account of the various 
approaches that might be taken in elucidating the commitments that would seem to be 
associated with assertion.
 14. Green (2017d) offers a characterization of communicative irony in expressive terms.
 15. See also Bertolet (2017), who argues that well-known considerations in favor of positing 
indirect speech acts are less persuasive than is widely thought.
 16. “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for current purposes of the 
exchange).” Grice (1967), 26.
 17. Gilbert (1989) denies the arbitrariness condition on the ground that, for instance, it is con-
ventional to write a thank-you note to a host after a dinner party; but she sees nothing 
arbitrary in this practice. I would rejoin that although expressing gratitude for a kindness 
is not arbitrary, nevertheless, expressing such gratitude by means of a thank-you note is. 
(We could just as well have adopted a practice of sending flowers or inviting the host 
to lunch).
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 18. Millikan denies the regularity requirement, contending that there are conventional behaviors 
(such as writing a thank-you note to the host after a party or handing out cigars after the 
birth of a child) that are uncommon.
 19. “A pattern may prevail over easily invented alternatives merely because it is easier or more 
natural to copy than to use one’s imagination, or because people prefer to do as others 
do . . . or because what is familiar is as such pleasing, or because people feel more secure in 
the tried and true” (Millikan 1998, 8).
 20. We should also be dubious of Millikan’s claim that believing what one has been told is 
an act that is not under one’s voluntary control. While it is plausible that we normally 
spontaneously and unreflectively accept what we are told by sources we know to be 
reliable, we also need to keep in view the importance, and presumably also the possibility 
of, a skeptical, Missouri-style attitude that encourages us to demur from others’ claims 
that we find some reason to doubt.
 21. According to the account offered in Green (2016b) (itself a generalization of that offered 
in Green [2007] and Green [2011]), one expresses psychological state S just in case one 
does something that expresses one’s S, or is expressive of S. Further elucidations are then 
provided to explain what is involved in expressing one’s own psychological state, as well as 
of doing something, that is expressive of a psychological state.
 22. I am assuming that one can make conjectures, guesses, and suppositions for the sake of 
argument in the privacy of one’s thoughts, and that one can also perform speech acts that 
express the states of mind that such private acts help to constitute. (See Green [2000a] for 
further discussion). Also, the expressivist account of assertion developed here might 
seem, objectionably, to rule out the possibility of anonymous assertions. Pedro comes out 
to his car from the hardware store to find that someone has left under a windshield wiper 
a note with the words, “You’re bald, Mister!” The writer of the unkind note is anony-
mously asserting that Pedro is bald. I contend that such an act is still overt: the writer 
is making manifest her intention to manifest her belief, while at the same time keeping 
hidden whose belief it is. A similar point would be applicable to a case in which a person 
leaves a recorded message for Pedro but distorts the recording in such a way as to mask 
her identity.
 23. The example is inspired by one from Stalnaker (2014).
 24. I argue for the point in Green (2017c).
 25. See Stainton (2006) for detailed arguments for this same conclusion.
 26. Kölbel responds to examples of this kind on behalf of a strong form of force-convention-
alism. He imagines “A and B, who are work colleagues . . . conversing during their lunch 
break in a café near their workplace. Their boss, C, is mentioned. C is notoriously stingy 
and obsessed with his employees getting back on time from their lunch breaks. A utters: 
‘You know, C has decided to hand out lunch-packs from now on and to force us to have 
lunch in the office. The cost will be deducted from our salaries.’ The joke will work par-
ticularly well if B takes it seriously for a moment. But should we say that A’s utterance was 
not an assertion that C has decided to hand out lunch packs, and so on? I believe that 
would be counterintuitive. Now, Davidson might insist that it is not an assertion, because 
it is a joke. But how do we explain that the joke works particularly well if B initially takes 
it seriously? I believe the best explanation is that A’s utterance was an assertion . . . and that 
as a result of a pragmatic process, it does not, ultimately count as a vicious attempt to 
deceive B, but as a prank or joke” (Kölbel 2010, 121). Kölbel describes his overall position 
as one on which the rules of language specify that a certain form of conduct (uttering an 
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assertoric sentence), carried out under certain general conditions (being a member of a 
speech community engaged in a conversation), counts as making an assertion. Given this 
position as well as Kölbel’s response to the joke example, it should be clear that he is not 
attempting to elucidate the ordinary concept of assertion.
 27. Grice defined conversational implicature disjunctively, referring in that definition to a 
situation in which a speaker either says or makes as if to say something. The latter disjunct 
is intended to include cases such as metaphor and irony. However, saying is most naturally 
construed as a locutionary act, and on this construal, making as if to say something is pos-
sible but requires considerable stage setting. By contrast, for Grice, one who for instance 
speaks ironically makes as if to illocute, rather than making as if to locute. Green (2017d) 
discusses Grice’s view on irony at further length.
 28. Less pressing for present purposes, but also of note, the B-list contains at least one member 
unlike the others. For all that the use of the term mandates, one can convey a proposition 
simply by bringing it to someone’s attention, as would normally be achieved by an utter-
ance of “Consider the proposition that P.” By contrast, the other items on the list seem 
to require their propositional content to be speaker-meant.
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